These experimental methods cover the entire continuum spectrum spanning the lab to the field in the spirit of the comprehensive taxonomy of experiments proposed by Harrison and List (2004) , that is: (i) conventional lab experiments, that involve student subjects, abstract framing, a lab context, and a set of imposed rules; (ii) artefactual field experiments, that depart from conventional lab experiments in that they involve non-student samples; (iii)
framed field experiments, that add to artefactual field experiments a field context in the commodity, stakes, task or information; and, finally, (iv) natural field experiments, that depart from framed field experiments in that subjects undertake the tasks in their natural environment, and subjects do not know that they take part into an experiment. Furthermore, behavioural experiments in health consider and test principles and insights from both behavioural economics and conventional economics (and their combination), and the decision situations in behavioural experiments in health are usually set or framed in a health, healthcare, or medical context.
Common to experimental social and behavioural sciences, moreover, the outcomes of behavioural experiments in health are "behavioural", that is, they consist of directly observable and measurable behavioural responses, rather than self-reported statements.
Typically, subjects in behavioural experiments in health are directly observed in field situations or face real consequences for their stated choices or behaviours through aligned monetary and non-monetary incentives. Behaviours and decisions of participants to a behavioural experiment in health are thus typically (whenever possible) "incentivecompatible", in the usual experimental economics sense that participants bear real behavioural consequences for their choices in the experiment.
As witnessed by some of the papers selected for this special issue, the current community of behavioural health experimentalists interprets behavioural experiments in health with a fair degree of tolerance, flexibility, and open-mindedness when it comes to, for example, the 4 measurement of economic preferences in the health domain. This is not because the community disagrees with the traditional experimental economics view that answers to hypothetical questions can significantly differ from responses to incentive-compatible tests because "talk is cheap" if there are no real behavioural consequences (the so-called "hypothetical bias"). Rather, it is because at the moment the literature on behavioural experiments in health lacks a systematic body of consensus methods to measure healthrelated preferences with real non-monetary consequences.
Finally, and following the usual convention in experimental economics, in behavioural experiments in health subjects are typically not deceived. Some behavioural experiments in health can, however, entail some degree of "obfuscation" when, in the attempt to minimise possible "experimenter demand effects" (Zizzo, 2010) , subjects are not told about the exact purpose and research question of the experiment. This is in line with the spirit of those experiments that intend to minimise the alteration of, and interference with, naturally occurring behaviour by not telling subjects that they are part of an experiment (that is, in the spirit of "natural field experiments" according to the taxonomy by Harrison and List, 2004;  and also of "lab-field" experiments as in Dolan and Galizzi, 2014) .
To sum up, five characterising features of behavioural experiments in health are therefore: (a) the fact that the decisions and behaviours are health-related; (b) the fact that, whenever possible, the outcomes of the decisions in the experiment are "behavioural" in the sense of consisting of directly observable and measurable behavioural responses, or of bearing real consequences for the decision-makers; (c) the consideration and testing of principles and insights from both behavioural economics and conventional economics, as well as their combination; (d) the use of a broad range of experiments spanning from the lab to the field;
and (e) the tendency to avoid deception which, however, does not prevent the use of obfuscation, natural field experiments, and lab-field experiments.
The papers selected in this special issue do not cover the entire spectrum of the behavioural experiments in health from the lab to the field, since virtually all papers are lab experiments framed in medical or health contexts. However, they report a selection of lab experiments on topics that, we believe, are of broad interest for both health economists and experimental economists, such as: how competition and incentives affect physicians' medical service provision; how physicians sort into different payment systems; and how the organisation of healthcare affects the efficiency and quality of medical services.
The special issue begins with three papers analysing behaviour in healthcare markets, all of which are well grounded in theory to derive behavioural predictions for the experiments. "gateway" survey questions lead to significantly higher estimates of the prevalence.
All papers in the special issue underwent regular scientific peer review. A total of fifteen papers were originally submitted to the special issue, eight of which were accepted for publication.
